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Abstract 
In almost all West-European countries and large parts of the world the governance of public safety 
tops political priorities at both national and local level. We can observe a growing attention for 
public safety issues in our cities and streets, resulting in local communities and authorities that 
increasingly have the possibility to deal with these issues in a rather autonomous way. In this 
contribution, I discuss the local governance of safety through a critical analysis and reflection of 
inherent, new regulatory tools within an administrative or civil framework. In doing so, I focus on 
the precarious position of three specific categories, i.e. minors and youth, panhandlers and 
‘potential’ drug users. This analysis starts off with and draws a parallel to broader social and 
political trends, which criminologists have described as the shift from a ‘post-crime’ to a ‘pre-
crime’ society where pre-emptive logics, mechanisms of exclusion and the criminalization of 
behavior tend to prevail. 
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 Introduction: safety in insecure times 
In almost all West-European countries and large parts of the world, the governance of public 
safety tops political priorities at both national and local level. The growing attention for public 
safety issues in our cities and streets seem to adopt the size of a societal quest, even to that extent 
that several sociologists and criminologists observe a paradigm shift from traditional (penal) 
welfarism to a risk society or culture of control (Garland 2001; van Swaaningen 2005). Floating 
on neo-liberal and neo-conservative agendas, this paradigm shift is guided by a new discourse 
where notions such as ‘responsabilization’, ‘professionalization’, ‘privatization’, 
‘commercialization’, ‘efficiency and efficacy’, enter the debates and quickly gained amplitude (van 
Swaaningen 2005; Schuilenburg and van Swaaningen 2013). Under these circumstances and over 
the last couple of decades, public safety issues have moved from a relatively exclusive task of the 
police to a mission and shared responsibility of the community at large and a growing number of 
public-private partnerships (Crawford 2006; van Swaaningen 2005; Pleysier 2008). It is exactly 
this growing diversification and pluralization of actors and mechanisms of control and 
surveillance that is generally described as the local ‘governance’ of public safety (Crawford 2002; 
2006; 2011; Schuilenburg 2012). 
In this contribution I aim to reflect on and analyze these trends in the local governance of 
safety and more importantly the emergence of new regulatory tools that differ from a traditional 
post-hoc criminal justice approach to public safety and crime control. As these trends can be 
observed in most Western jurisdictions, they do not appear in a sociological vacuum but are to be 
understood against the backdrop of a diagnosis of our late modern society (Schuilenburg and van 
Swaaningen 2013).  
In what follows, I will therefore start with and draw parallels to broader macro-
sociological observations that are mirrored in the field of criminology and criminal justice as a 
shift from a ‘post-crime’ to a ‘pre-crime’ society where precaution and pre-emptive logics tend to 
prevail. As others have already described the relevance of this ‘sign of the times’ to the debate on 
crime control and public safety, I limit myself to outline some quintessential aspects of these 
broader observations as they are pivotal in understanding the debate surrounding the governance 
of safety and the regulation and normalization of behavior in the public domain.  
In the second part of the article, I will illustrate and elaborate on these new regulatory 
mechanisms and the potential implications on the normalization of behavior in public.  In doing 
so, three specific categories or ‘cases’ will be reflected upon, i.e. minors and youth, homelessness 
and panhandling, and ‘potential’ drug users. The precarious position of these three cases tend to 
illuminate and sharpen our understanding of the conditions of a pre-crime society and the 
functioning of pre-emptive politics of behavior. The selection of cases is inspired by and will 
depart from the local governance of safety and the system of administrative sanctions in Belgium. 
However, the reflection and analysis based on these cases will surpass the specificity of the 
Belgian situation and touch upon the broader debate and underlying motivations which are, as 
mentioned, to a large extent shared and similar in neighboring jurisdictions and other countries.   
 
Risk, pre-crime and precaution 
The above mentioned paradigm shift from a welfare state, focused on the production of 
prosperity, to a society that is intolerant towards all kinds of uncertainty and insecurity, refers 
first of all to Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society (1992; Crawford 2002; Boutellier 2002). Beck argues that 
our society has entered the phase of a reflexive modernity where the accumulation of knowledge 
and technology is paralleled by a growing awareness of the production of risks and insecurities. 
Hence, the modernist project par excellence, the production of order, is losing ground to a 
defensive culture of control and the management of all sorts of risk. 
Life in our late modern risk society is ‘both a glorious and a frightening time’; “the system 
of coordinates in which life and thinking are fastened (…) begins to shake, and a new twilight of 
opportunities and hazards comes into existence” (Beck 1992: 15; Giddens and Hutton 2000). 
According to Zygmunt Bauman, we live in a ‘liquid’ era in which society and individuals within 
society struggle to balance new freedoms and possibilities on the one hand, and our modern quest 
for certainty, security and safety, or in German, Sicherheit, on the other hand (Bauman 2000). 
Boutellier (2002) referred to that balance as the heads and tails of a coin, with ‘vitality’ on the one 
hand and ‘security’ on the other, which can only be combined in a utopian world. The erosion of 
solid ground and traditional routines and the growing liquidity of all aspects of life and society 
has promoted the control of risks and the precaution principle as the Leitmotiv of a fearful society. 
These macro-sociological observations are mirrored in the field of criminal justice and 
crime control. In a society characterized by the management and reduction of uncertainty, more 
than ever the focus will shift towards the registration, archiving, classification and detection of all 
sorts of risk (Schinkel 2011). The discourse on crime and law enforcement has notably moved 
from ‘crime and punishment’ over ‘risk and control’ to ‘uncertainty and precaution’ (Boutellier 
2011: 66; Pleysier 2014a). In that perspective, Lucia Zedner (2007; 2009) implicitly bridged the 
international fight against terrorism and the local governance of public safety in our cities and 
streets. Zedner captured the above mentioned and broad societal trends into the transformation 
of, as she described, a post-crime society to a pre-crime society. In a pre-crime society law 
enforcement is no longer based on the transgression of (criminal) law, but on the reduction of 
insecurity and unsafety, and therefore the early detection and intervention of potential risky 
behavior. A pre-crime society operates under the precaution principle and aims at the ‘governance 
of the unknowable’ (Zedner 2009: 128). The dominant logic is pre-emptive, hence the emergence 
of new mechanisms of control and surveillance. “Pre-crime (…) shifts the temporal perspective to 
anticipate and forestall that which has not yet occurred and may never do so” (Zedner 2007: 262). 
Following Schuilenburg (2005), I have illustrated the concept of a pre-crime society in 
previous publications by referring to the science fiction novel and film Minority Report (Pleysier 
2012; 2014a). Minority Report was written in 1954 by Philip K. Dick, a notorious science fiction 
author, and turned into a film by Steven Spielberg in 2002. The plot is set in Washington D.C. anno 
2054 where in the past six years not a single murder had been committed: a pre-crime police unit 
is able to predict and prevent, based on visions of three so-called pre-cogs (i.e. pre-cognition), 
future crime and murders. According to Schuilenburg (2005), Minority Report is therefore a 
perfect metaphor for our contemporary system of law enforcement and crime control which is 
equally guided by precaution and pre-emptive interventions. The film provokes fundamental 
reflections on human agency and how law enforcement is organized in a society preoccupied with 
risk and uncertainty. It allows us to see that a pre-crime society has surpassed the idea of risk 
calculation and exchanged it for the precaution principle which aims at the governance of the 
unknowable and absolute intolerance towards future and uncertain risks (Zedner 2009: 126; 
Boutellier 2011). Precaution does not require the possibility to calculate future risks before action 
is taken, which Zedner illustrates with a striking quote by former US Secretary of Defence Donald 
Rumsfeld in which he outlines how the war against terrorism in insecure times and uncertain 
conditions works: “There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are 
known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don’t know. But there are also 
unknown unknowns. There are things we don’t know we don’t know” (Zedner 2009: 126). 
 Pre-emptive politics of behavior 
It is not that difficult to recognize and transfer the above ideas to the local governance of safety 
debate. In a pre-crime society the focus of attention will be on registration, detection and control 
of future risks and (potential) risky behavior of individuals and groups. This trend also tends to 
pressurize the distinction between repression and prevention (Boutellier 2011). A pre-emptive 
logic will transform and downsize the traditional idea of prevention to the early detection, 
intervention and regulation of risky behavior. Willem Schinkel (2011) argues that the emergence 
of new forms of prevention in fact bends towards the idea of repression. He therefore calls it 
‘prepression’, as “a pro-active repression that attempts the timely suppression of certain forms of 
life. It attempts the ‘adjustment of the present way of life’” (Schinkel 2011: 372). This prepression 
is not prevention ‘as we know it’, but the repression of ‘risky causal chains’ supported by new 
technologies of registration, archiving and control, and the suppression of alternative ‘possible 
worlds’. Zedner (2009: 74) also mentioned the arrival of new preventive measures that “seek to 
anticipate and forestall harms long before they occur”, in order to maximize security in a proactive 
manner. Following Schuilenburg (2005) I would like to refer to Minority Report one last time. The 
prepressive control of crime by the pre-crime unit is grounded on the idea that there is no 
alternative outcome possible and therefore no ‘alternative worlds’ exist. In other words, the future 
offender has no other possibility than to commit the offense. The plot, however, hence the title, is 
all about the existence of divergent scenarios or ‘minority reports’ that are silenced and ignored 
within the pre-crime system because they show the possibility of alternative worlds where a 
potential murderer does not commit the murder (Schuilenburg 2005: 7; Pleysier 2012). 
Prepression and the proactive or pre-emptive logic of early detection and intervention has led to 
a ‘politics of behavior’ aimed at controlling and regulating undesirable and risky behavior of 
individuals and groups in the public domain (Crawford 2009a; 2009b; 2011).  
 
New regulatory tools 
In line with the above and parallel to the macro-sociological trends mentioned, we indeed observe 
the birth of ‘new regulatory tools’ and initiatives in order to tackle petty crime, public nuisance 
and antisocial behavior. In most Western countries and jurisdictions local governments and 
communities have adopted strategies and introduced regulations to tackle threats to the public 
order and security (Chesnay et al. 2013; van Stokkom 2011; Baillergeau 2014). According to 
Crawford (2009a) these ‘new hybrid tools of regulation’ degraded the traditional law and order 
criminal prosecution from the answer to crime and safety issues to part of a much larger 
framework of sanctioning and regulation. Much in line with this, Chesnay et al. (2013: 163) use 
the concept of ‘penalization’ to refer to the growing tendency to resort to regulatory, civil or 
administrative law rather than criminal law as “the primary normative punitive system in 
resolution of conflicts related to the use of public spaces”.  
In the Netherlands, Bas van Stokkom (2011; 2013) reports a growing intolerance towards 
behavior in public and certain types of incivilities such as ignoring red lights, jumping the queue 
and drinking beer in parks. This growing intolerance has indeed led to the expansion of legislation 
and powers to the local police and policy in deploying proactive and reactive strategies of 
regulating unwanted and undesirable behavior in public. Van Stokkom (2013) followed Crawford 
(2009a) in labelling these regulatory policies in public space as ‘politics of behavior’. Moreover, 
and mainly in larger cities in the Netherlands, he sees a growing tendency towards offensive 
practices that are deployed in order to ban and exclude a variety of ‘defiant’ citizens (beggars, 
homeless people, prostitutes, addicts, loitering youth, etc.) from the public or semi-public domain 
(van Stokkom 2013; 2011). According to van Stokkom (2011), this outcome is largely the result 
of pro-active police officers who were in recent years commissioned to issue far more tickets and 
fines for minor or low level breaches of community regulations or rules. In a number of articles, 
Schuilenburg explored and analyzed several of these ‘exclusionary’ practices in the Netherlands, 
such as the collective shop ban, pub ban and public transport ban. In his view, these practices 
could indeed be captured under the umbrella of new civil and administrative instruments – ‘quasi 
criminal law’ –  aimed at regulating access to and behavior in public and semi-public space 
(Schuilenburg 2009; Wesselink et al. 2009; Schuilenburg and van Steden 2014a; 2014b).  
In a similar way, Crawford (2009a; 2009b) describes how antisocial behavior in England 
and Wales is tackled by so-called ASBO’s or Anti-Social Behavior Orders. These orders perfectly 
fit the above mentioned pre-crime logic in the sense that, according to Crawford (2009a), they 
exhibit a logic in which antisocial behavior is seen as or serves as a precursor to crime prompting 
pre-emption and prevention. Inspired by Broken Windows theory, antisocial behavior is seen as a 
‘first step in a developmental trajectory’ for both individuals and communities, and therefore 
countered by ASBO legislation in order to prevent, at the individual level, ‘more serious offending’ 
by ‘nipping individual criminal careers in the bud’, and at the community level, spirals of decline 
of disorder, fear and crime (Crawford 2009a: 816). Again, a range of powers or regulatory 
technologies, significantly expanded in recent years, can be deployed within the ASBO legislation. 
Although comparable bans to those described in the Netherlands exist, one specific tool that 
catches the eye is the dispersal power. Crawford (2009a; 2009b) argues that dispersal orders are 
indicative for the broader pre-emptive and precautionary logic as described above. Apparently, 
the mere presence of a group of individuals in a designated (dispersal) area can be sufficient to 
warrant a dispersal order if that presence “is deemed likely to result in a member of the public being 
‘harassed, intimidated, alarmed or distressed’”, even if those individuals have not actually done 
anything (Crawford 2009a: 823). According to some authors, as governments increasingly fail to 
capture and resolve larger societal problems, they seem to resort their energy to the ‘micro-
management’ of public behavior (Crawford 2009a: 814; Schuilenburg and van Steden 2014b). 
Since 1999 a federal law in Belgium also offers local communities and authorities the 
possibility to deal with public safety, nuisance and anti-social behavior in an autonomous way 
(Cops et al. 2012). Cities and communities are able to draft their own community rules, and 
enforce and penalize infractions to that code with a system of administrative sanctions. The need 
to do so was facilitated by at least two elements that stirred both the political debate and public 
opinion.  A first element is the perception or belief that experiences of public nuisance and 
disorder are related to fear of crime (Devroe 2012). A second element that facilitated the system 
of administrative sanctions was, much like in the Netherlands, a generally assumed feeling of 
impunity and a growing intolerance towards petty crime, incivilities and ‘undesirable’ behavior in 
the public domain (van Stokkom 2011; Devroe 2012). Legislative changes in January 2014 led to 
lowering the minimum age from 16 to 14 years old, and expanding the range of possible 
administrative sanctions. Apart from the traditional fines (up to €350; €175 for minors), 
communities can also suggest mediation or a community service (up to 30 hours; 15 hours for 
minors). Furthermore, a specific article offers mayors the possibility to impose a designated public 
place ban for a period of one month (with the possibility to prolong this period twice) to 
individuals who disturb public order in specific places.  
In the remainder of this contribution, I will depart from the Belgian system of 
administrative sanction and three specific categories or cases within that system, in order to raise 
some fundamental and more general questions related to the first part of the article. In doing so, 
one should bear in mind that compared to e.g. England and Wales or the Netherlands, the system 
of administrative sanctions in Belgium is a relatively ‘light’ instrument to deal with undesirable 
behavior in the public domain. Individuals who repeatedly breach local regulations can at most 
be sanctioned with a new administrative sanction. Breaching an ASBO in England and Wales, 
which is a civil order, can result in a criminal sanction. Apparently, and according to Crawford, 
over three fifths of adults and two-fifths of minors who breached their ASBO between 2001 and 
2006 were given a custodial sentence (Crawford 2009a: 825).  
Although in practice different systems exhibit large divergences, there are undeniably also 
important parallels and similarities. As was mentioned in the brief description of some countries 
above, it is clear that “(…) these new regulatory tools muddy the traditional distinctions between 
civil remedies and criminal sanctions and introduce a form of preventive exclusion that seeks to 
govern future behaviour rather than regulate past conduct” (Crawford 2011: 502-503; 2009a: 
818). Indeed, these new regulatory practices are to a large extent based on the idea and 
philosophy of Broken Windows theory and the suppression of causal chains, i.e. future criminal 
careers (Crawford 2009a; van Stokkom 2011; Baillergeau 2014; Chesnay et al. 2013). The 
precautionary logic and micro-management of behavior in public seems to result in controlling, 
disciplining and, in the end, the possible exclusion of certain ‘risky’ individuals and groups from 
the public domain (Schuilenburg and van Steden 2014b). In what follows, I aim to substantiate 
and illustrate the above mentioned ideas by elaborating on three specific ‘cases’, departing from 
the Belgian system of administrative sanctions, i.e. minors and youth, homelessness and 
panhandling, and ‘potential’ drug users. The precarious position of these three specific cases or  
categories tend to illuminate and sharpen our understanding of the conditions of a pre-crime 
society and the functioning of pre-emptive politics of behavior. 
 
Three specific cases 
Minors as pre-criminals 
Earlier I mentioned that in Belgium young people from the age of 14 onwards can be subject of an 
administrative sanction. The lowering of the age limit was to a large extent a symbolic change that 
elicited discussion and is up to this moment the subject of a case at the Constitutional Court in 
Belgium. This change has mainly been promoted by a number of mayors from larger cities who 
pleaded in favor of the possibility to have administrative sanctions for young people from the age 
of 14 (or even 12) when causing disorder and public nuisance. In a newspaper opinion article, 
Patrick Janssens, former mayor of the city of Antwerp, argued the necessity to sanction young 
people below the age of 16 by stating that “those who deem it unjust to expand the system of 
administrative sanctions to minus 16, should ask themselves what is more unjust: to wait until young 
people are that derailed that the only place they belong in is a juvenile detention center, or to try to 
set them back on track, gentle yet firm, at a younger age” (De Morgen 24.01.2012, own translation). 
The current mayor of Antwerp, Bart De Wever, promoted the lowering of the age limit in a much 
similar way, stating that “with some youngsters, you need to intervene as young as 12 otherwise 
things will go wrong” (Het Laatste Nieuws 31.05.2013, own translation). This line of argument 
surrounding the age limit was recycled in the final draft of the 2014 law that was presented by the 
former Minister of Interior Joëlle Milquet who stated that lowering the minimum age to 14 is a 
necessary means to ‘prevent a spiral of delinquency’ (Pleysier 2013). 
The above arguments illustrate how a prepressive approach towards disorder and 
antisocial behavior is based on the idea that no alternative worlds exist. It promotes a vision 
where night-time revel and noisy enjoyment, urinating in public space, etc., inevitably will lead to 
a criminal career unless communities intervene at an early stage to stop this assumed spiral of 
decay and delinquency. This reasoning not only highlights the argument that antisocial behavior 
needs ‘nipping in the bud’ in order to prevent worse from happening, it also supports a 
deterministic approach towards human agency that can be ascribed to the idea of a pre-crime 
society (Zedner 2009). This recalls an infamous BBC interview with former UK Prime Minister 
Tony Blair in which he answers to a question on the crime- and prevention policy of the 
government saying that “there is not going to be a solution [to the problem of youth antisocial 
behavior] unless we are sufficiently hard-headed to say that from a very early age we need a system 
of intervention” (Case and Haines 2009: 280). Case and Haines (2009: 295) point in that regard to 
the possible risks of a system where, often well-intentioned, early intervention strategies 
intervene in the life of individuals because of a potential and abstract (group) risk or an uncertain 
future and label those individuals as ‘high risk’ or ‘inevitably pre-criminal’. In a similar manner, 
Ashworth and Zedner (2012) question to what extent it is justified to intervene at an early stage 
and criminalize certain behavior in order to prevent uncertain future risks and harms that ‘might’ 
be done. 
The strategy to early detect and intervene on ‘undesirable’ behavior is accompanied with 
and influenced by what Boutellier (2011) has called a ‘moral inversion’. The combination of new 
regulatory tools and a conservative revival has sharpened selective practices of preventative 
exclusion in the public domain “that seeks to govern future behavior rather than regulate past 
conduct” (Crawford 2011: 502-503). Building on Goffman’s Behaviour in Public Places (1963) and 
Relations in Public (1971), Dixon et al. (2006) indeed argue that certain practices are classified as 
incivilities because they can be seen as infractions of the moral order in public life. Hence, conduct 
becomes ‘situationally inappropriate’ or ‘unacceptable’ (Dixon et al. 2006: 188). This element will 
also return in the discussion on the second case or illustration. In England and Wales, Crawford 
has illustrated this by referring to the emergence of a number of wide-ranging restrictions such 
as designated public places orders, dispersal powers, drinking bans, etc. (Crawford 2009a; 2009b; 
2011). Schuilenburg mentioned similar mechanisms by using the concept of ‘selective exclusion’ 
in the Netherlands (Schuilenburg 2012). In the margin of the new legislation on administrative 
sanctions in Belgium, I referred in the above to a new power to the mayor to impose designated 
public place bans to individuals who disturb public order in specific places. Several cities and 
communities also have a public drinking ban that disallows drinking alcohol in a designated area 
which can be enforced by an administrative sanction. Although these pre-emptive regulations of 
‘undesirable’ behavior are not necessarily specifically aimed at young people, in their 
consequence these restrictions and bans further hypothecated the position of certain societal 
groups, such as young people, in public space (Crawford 2009a; 2009b).  
 
Homelessness and panhandling in sterile city centers 
As in several other countries, Belgium abolished in 1993 an old criminal law that penalized 
panhandling and vagabondage. Although aggressive solicitation and exploiting people to 
panhandle is still punishable by criminal law, several propositions to reintroduce a ban on 
panhandling as such have been discussed in parliament. Based on that abolition, one could 
conclude that there is a de facto right to beg, seek alms and appeal on others’ solidarity. What we 
see, however, is that cities and communities try to recover the abolished ban using the system of 
administrative sanctions by stipulating in their police or community codex that panhandling is 
forbidden in a specific perimeter or designated area of the city or community. Local authorities 
defend this ban by referring to the supposed fact that panhandling is often a pretext for 
pickpocketing and shoplifting, which feeds the above mentioned idea that in order to prevent theft 
one has to intervene on the ‘antecedent’ behavior, i.e. panhandling. 
These local bans still exist in different communities, although the Council of State in 
Belgium has in a recent past recalled different communities that have tried banning panhandling 
in their city center using similar codes and likewise arguments. As one can still penalize aggressive 
panhandling, pickpocketing or shoplifting by using criminal law, the arguments of local 
authorities are not fully waterproof. Furthermore, it might be considered somewhat strange and 
even short-sighted to tackle panhandling by giving beggars a fine. Local authorities, however, do 
have a responsibility to maintain public order and safety in their community, which inspired 
several communities to add the adjective ‘aggressive’ or ‘obtrusive’ to the concerning article in 
their codex.  
The question is whether (obtrusive) panhandling is indeed tackled by those authorities 
because of the threat it poses to public order and local safety. If that would be the case, one could 
wonder why the undesirable behavior of panhandling is seemingly only undesirable and 
unwanted in specific designated areas in the city. This reflects the above mentioned idea of Dixon 
et al. (2006: 188-189) that conduct and behavior in public space is defined as ‘situationally 
inappropriate’ based on ‘normative definitions’ of place. Behavior is defined as problematic and 
deemed punishable not because of the behavior in se, but because it is ‘out of place’ (Dixon et al. 
2006; van Stokkom 2013; Margier et al. 2014). In most cases this perimeter of the ban on 
panhandling is situated around the commercial city center and shopping streets. In their study on 
homeless people in Canada, Chesnay et al. (2013) point to the fact that the visibility of 
homelessness urged cities to reaffirm the city center as ‘focused on consumption, leisure, and 
luxury’. As such, the behavior of homeless people, but also loitering young people, could be 
considered ‘out of place’: it violates “the consumerist norms that regulate public life in such spaces” 
(Dixon et al. 2006: 190). 
In fact, this reasoning brings us back to Bauman (1997) and what he has described as ‘the 
dream of purity’. According to Bauman, who is here inspired by Douglas Purity and Danger (1966), 
parallel to our modern urge for (a vision of) order we dream of purity: “purity is a vision of things 
put in places” (Bauman 1997: 6). Furthermore, the opposite of purity (‘dirt’) or order are then 
things ‘out of place’. The idea of ‘situationally inappropriate’ behavior (Dixon et al. 2006), returns 
when Bauman (1997: 6) states that it “is not the intrinsic quality of things which makes them into 
‘dirt’, but solely their location; more precisely, their location in the order of things envisaged by the 
purity-seekers”. The commercial hearts of our cities are increasingly designed to be sterile, zero 
friction places, aimed at leisure and consummation, and with as little distraction away from that 
aim as possible (van Stokkom 2013; Schuilenburg and van Steden 2014a; Crawford 2011). In 
these sanitized public spaces, homeless people and beggars are ‘out of place’, they are 
‘unappetizing’ ‘polluting agents’ (Bauman 1997: 6; van Stokkom 2013; Margier et al. 2014). 
It is in that respect perhaps also indicative that in some cities in Belgium, based on the 
code of administrative sanctions, it is seemingly considered as an aggravated circumstance if one 
panhandles ‘by using animals’, or ‘generates charity from people in the streets by exposing one’s 
handicap, bodily disfiguration, mutilation or injuries’. This strategy not only points to mechanisms 
of selective exclusion or banning of impure and undesirable individuals from certain parts of the 
city, it also stigmatizes and criminalizes homeless people and beggars because of their ‘otherness’. 
This process of ‘othering’ and the exclusive mechanisms in our society are closely interrelated: 
“there are imaginary geographies which place imperfect minorities in marginalised locations: in a 
social elsewhere” (Ruggiero 2000: 1, quoted in Goodey 2002: 135). Elsewhere, I illustrated the 
above with a reference to Les yeux des pauvres (‘The eyes of the poor’), a within urban sociology 
well-known poem by Charles Baudelaire (Pleysier 2014b). In this poem, Baudelaire and his 
company close a romantic night in a café at one of Paris’ beautiful boulevards. The perfect night 
out, until they are ‘disturbed’ by the hungry eyes of a threesome dressed in rags. Baudelaire is 
touched by that family of eyes, and feels ashamed ‘of our glasses and our carafes, much larger than 
our thirst’, but all the more because of the reaction of his love when she said to him: ‘I can’t stand 
those people over there, with their eyes wide open like carriage gates! Can’t you tell the head-
waiter to send them away?’. 
 
Looking for drugs and the regulation of intentions 
A final case or illustration I wish to elaborate on in this contribution departs from a particular 
article in the police codex of the city of Antwerp. This article states that it is forbidden to frequent 
the public domain with the aim of purchasing illegal drugs, what is further deduced in e.g. the 
prohibition of behavioural proceedings that cause public nuisance and that are related to the 
search for drug dealers or go-betweens in the purchase or consumption of illegal drugs. These 
‘behavioural proceedings’ are subsequently defined as ‘hanging about in streets, squares, parks or 
places adjacent to the public space, etc.’ (Flamand 2011). Flamand indicates that, given the fact 
that local authorities are not allowed to adopt legislation that can be penalized at a higher level, 
the specific article is not targeted towards infringements against criminal law, but is in fact an 
article on ‘drugs-related or intended nuisance’. This raises however important questions, since it 
de facto penalizes ‘intentions’: civil servants who register infractions will have to be able to ‘look 
inside the head’ and sense the motives and intentions of those who behave in public in a certain 
way. In doing so, local authorities trespass the unauthorized domain of the ‘moral public order’ 
where the system of administrative sanctions is by law confined to the domain of ‘material public 
order’ (Flamand 2011: 11). 
This particular case exemplifies a broader issue that has already been raised at least 
implicitly in the above. Based on a study on urban intervention teams in Rotterdam, the 
Netherlands, Schuilenburg (2009; 2012) observes a ‘new interference’ or meddling in the social 
life of civilians that can be ascribed to a renewed paternalism or re-moralization of our 
contemporary society (see also Boutellier 2011; Margier et al. 2014). As was the case with 
homelessness and panhandling, public safety and order could to some extent be seen as a ‘sophist’ 
reason to tackle welfare and care issues. Schuilenburg (2009) mentions how, in a pre-crime 
society focusing on early detection and intervention, there is a thin line between health and 
welfare on the one hand, and crime, security and safety on the other hand. Witnessing a paradigm 
shift from a traditional welfarist approach to a risk society and culture of control has to a certain 
extent indeed instrumentalized questions of care and wellbeing into a framework focused on the 
early detection and intervention of all sorts of risk. In that respect, ‘nuisance policing’ contributes 
to the ‘invisibilization of social problems’ (Baillergeau 2014: 5). 
With a final reference to the Belgian practice of administrative sanctions, we can see that 
some cities indeed developed and cultivated a practice where the administrative fine is used as a 
lever or big stick to motivate individuals into a community service, intervention or program. 
Based on similar observations in the Netherlands, Schuilenburg (2009: 17) refers to the concept 
of ‘outreaching’, as a combination of care and control, borrowed from the field of social work. In a 
similar way actors within the above mentioned regulatory tools and practices use what they call 
‘assertive outreach’ as a prepressive and normative approach to what are in essence social  
problems (Pleysier 2013). 
 
  
Conclusion 
Departing from three specific ‘cases’, the aim of this article was to reflect upon recent trends in 
the local governance of safety and the emergence of new regulatory tools. The cases served as 
illustrations, and although I do not wish to deny obvious differences across and within countries 
and jurisdictions, they lead to a number of reflections and conclusions that surpass both the level 
of the particular cases and the Belgian context in which they are situated. First, they could be 
considered as indicative for the broader macro-sociological observations and more in particular 
the observed trends in the field of crime control and the governance of safety. In line with others, 
this was summed up in a shift from a ‘post-crime’ to a ‘pre-crime’ society where precaution and 
pre-emptive logics assume a pivotal position (Zedner 2007; 2009). Hence, behavior in the public 
domain is increasingly labelled as ‘antisocial’, ‘risky’, and even ‘pre-criminal’. It is a precursor of a 
criminal career and needs therefore ‘nipping in the bud’ (Crawford 2009a). In doing so, Crawford 
(2009b) argues that even the mere presence of (groups of) youngsters in public spaces can be 
seen as problematic, and normal activities and youth sociability are at risk of becoming 
criminalized.  
Secondly, the case or illustration surrounding homelessness and panhandling in the city 
center pointed to a next layer in the above conclusion. Based on this debate, it becomes clear that 
crime and safety seemingly are convenient pretenses to control and exclude certain (groups of) 
‘undesirable’ individuals from (certain parts of) the public domain. The exclusion of these groups 
is not in the first place based on their threat to the public order and safety, but in the fact that they 
seem to violate unspoken ‘consumerist norms that regulate public life’ in the city center (Dixon et 
al. 2006; Crawford 2011). Their ‘otherness’ disrupts the ‘orderliness’ of the sterile city center 
focused on leisure and consumption. As Bauman stated, in a society of consumers, “flawed 
consumers are its most irksome and costly liabilities” (Bauman 2004: 39). Also, the pre-emptive 
exclusion of these undesirable and ‘irksome’ should be done in an aesthetically pleasing and 
consumer-friendly way (Crawford 2011: 495). These observations, according to Crawford (2011: 
483), point to a dynamic of exclusion that was previously confined to private and semi-public 
places, as the shopping mall, and is now gradually extending to the public realm. Apart from 
blurring boundaries between public and private, this also points to the ambiguous relationship 
“between inclusion and exclusion on the one hand and commercial imperatives and security demands 
on the other” (Crawford 2011: 512).  
The third and final illustration sums up both above mentioned conclusions in melting 
together the pre-emptive logic of crime control and the exclusion of the ‘undesirable’. The 
particular case exemplified strategies of early detection and intervention based on controlling 
motives and intentions (to buy or use illegal drugs). Much in line with the above and somewhat 
more in general, it points to the adoption of a ‘law and order’ discourse as a passe-partout to tackle 
and intervene in welfare and health issues. In their study in Rotterdam, Schinkel and van den Berg 
(2011: 1932) reported similar practices mixing prevention and assistance, and repression and 
control into an ‘ensemble of techniques of governmentality’ targeting specific urban 
subpopulations. Again, a blurring boundary is central, this time between health and welfare on 
the one hand, and crime, security and safety on the other hand (Schuilenburg 2009).  
Although we must be careful not to oversimplify or exaggerate the impact or generality of 
the observations and reflections raised in this contribution, the conclusion that we indeed seem 
to witness the emergence of new regulatory practices and pre-emptive mechanisms of control and 
normalization of behavior, is indeed not too farfetched. Moreover, these regulatory tools and 
practices tend to focus on the most vulnerable groups in our society. As such, it seems justified to 
broaden Crawford’s conclusion in his study on the criminalization of young people to other 
vulnerable groups in society to whom we not only tell that they are “not welcome in certain 
essential public places” but also convey “stark messages about their status and value in society more 
generally” (Crawford 2011: 513; 2009b: 22-23).   
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